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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a simple model of organization design for a bank by modifying the model by 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Two alternative forms of bank organization are considered. In the 
"single-layered" organization, each loan candidate is screened only once. In the "double-layered" 
organization, loans are screened twice and have to be accepted by two independent decision units. 
It is shown that the single-layered organization originates more loans but its portfolio includes a 
higher proportion of bad loans compared with the double-layered organization. The profits for a 
bank with single-layered organization are higher than that with double-layered organization if (a) 
the quality of initial portfolio is high, (b) the problem of Type I error is serious, (c) the problem of 
Type II error is small, and/or (d) the screening cost is high. When the bank optimally chooses the 
intensity of screening, given the organizational structure, the bank with single-layered organization 
chooses a higher level of efforts to improve the screening skill. The preliminary empirical analysis 
suggests that the model is consistent with the recent experience in Japanese banking. 
Prepared for the conference "Emerging Trends in Japanese Financial Markets" sponsored by the 
Center on Japanese Economy & Business at Columbia Business School. I am grateful to the 
Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance for financial support. I thank Miyoko 
Koike for research assistance. 
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1. Introduction 
Japanese banks currently face an enormous problem of bad loans. The amount of bad 
loans is estimated to be 23.4 trillion yen (about 234 billion dollars) for 21 major banks (city banks, 
trust banks, and long-term credit banks), and 37.4 trillion yen (roughly 374 trillion dollars) for all 
the financial institutions, or 7.8% of GDP.i If one includes the amount of loans for which the 
interest rate was reduced but not to below the discount rate, the amount of bad loans would 
increase a lot. Some non-governmental estimates suggest the amount of bad loans in this broader 
sense may exceed 100 trillion yen, or more than 20% of GDP. Then, the size of the problem is 
comparable to the insolvency problem that the Japanese banks faced immediately after the war 
when the Japanese government repudiated the war debts, when the amount of repudiated 
government debts and guarantees amounted to almost 20% of GNE (gross national expenditure). 
To tackle the insolvency problem, Japanese banks had to go through massive restructuring, which 
wiped off most of their capitals, forced many of them to cancel some deposits, and reqnired them 
to recapitalize.2 
Many bad loans today are those made in the late 1980s when the Japanese economy was 
moving and both stock and land prices were rising. Many loans were made to real estate related 
business with land as collateral. As the stock and land prices started to fall rapidly and the 
economy entered in a recession in the 1990s, the real estate related loans have turned into troubled 
loans. At the same time, the value of collaterals of those loans also fell because of the land price 
fall. This made the problem for banks more serious: the market values of collaterals were often far 
less than the book value of loans. 
1 The numbers are the sum of loans for falled companies, loans for which the interest 
payment has been suspended for more than 6 months, and loans with interest rates below the 
official discount rate, as of the end of September 1995. The Ministry of Finance surveyed all the 
financial institutions and published the result on November 14,1995. 
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 See Hoshi (1995) for a detailed account of bank restructuring and recapitalization in the 
postwar reconstruction period. 
Besides the increase of real estate loans, the 1980s noticed another change in the Japanese 
banking. This change happened inside the bank organization. Many banks changed the internal 
organization to simplify and speed up the loan origination process. More specifically, many banks 
abolished credit supervision divisions that used to double check the loans proposed by branches. 
This paper argues that the change in bank portfolio toward real estate loans is related to the 
organizational change. Applying a model of economic organization developed by Sah and Stiglitz 
(1986), I show the type of organizational change that many Japanese banks went through in the 
1980s increases the proportion of bad loans in bank assets. The paper also reports a preliminary 
empirical result that suggests the organizational change to abolish an independent credit supervision 
division in fact lead to worsening of portfolio. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines what type of organizational 
change that many Japanese bank went through, by examining the case of Sumitomo Bank, wnich 
first carried out such a reorganization among Japanese banks. Section 3 develops a model of bank 
organizational structure and loan origination based on Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Section 4 reports 
the preliminary empirical result, and the final section concludes. 
2. Organizational Change: Case of Sumitomo 
Sumitomo Bank was the first one among Japanese banks to implement an organizational 
change that eliminated credit evaluation function independent of other business promotion. Around 
1977, Sumitomo Bank started contemplating a major reorganization of bank structure to increase 
its profitability, wnich had been falling consistently.3 In early 1978, Sumitomo invited McKinsey 
& Company, Inc. to work on a major reorganization plan. The work by Sumitomo/McKinsey 
joint team culminated in a proposal, which stressed the importance of six principles: (i) capturing 
profit opportunities in international operation, (ii) responding to market needs in each region, (iii) 
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 The description of Sumitomo case depends on Sumitomo Bank (1985). 
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stressing the importance of profits at branches, (iv) dealing with large corporate customers who are 
reducing their dependence on banks, (v) systematically managing assets and liabilities, and (vi) 
striking balance between decentralization of decision and control of assets quality. The report 
advocated the organization divided according to market segment (i.e., by region, 
domestic/international, large customers/small customers, etc.) rather than the traditional one 
divided according to function (business promotion, credit supervision, foreign exchange, etc.) It 
also suggested improving decision making process to achieve efficient responses to profit 
opportunities. 
The report, which was submitted on December 1, 1978, formed the foundation for the 
reorganization that Sumitomo undertook in 1979. The new organizational structure started on July 
2. Figures 1 and 2 compare the old and the new structures of Sumitomo Bank. The new structure 
defines a division by the market segment it serves. For example, the Main Office Business 
Operation Department {Honten Eigyo Honbu) deals with large corporate customers in western 
Japan, and the Tokyo Business Operation Department {Tokyo Eigyo Honbu) serves large 
corporate customers in eastern Japan. Similarly, the Tokyo Business Department (Tokyo Gyomu 
Honbu) and the Business Department {Gyomu Honbu) handle small corporate customers and 
individual customers in eastern and western Japan respectively. All the functions, including both 
business promotion and credit monitoring, are done within a business division, which handles the 
customer, and there is no division like the credit supervision division in the old structure, which 
evaluates the loan independently from a business department. Arthough there is Credit Planning 
Division under the Planning Department, it cannot evaluate individual loans. Business 
Headquarter {Gyomu So-Honbu) and Business Operation Headquarter {Eigyo So-Honbu) could 
extend loans without consulting the Planning Headquarter {Kikaku So-Honbu). 
Compared with the old structure, the new structure has more streamlined decision making 
process. Duplications of efforts between divisions are minimized by assigning each customer to 
oniy one division and by not requiring double check of loans at the Credit Supervision Division. 
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Arter Sumitomo Bank changed its organizational structure, many Japanese banks followed. 
Many of those reorganizations had the same idea: making the decision making process more 
efficient by eliminating the double check by a credit supervision division. What are the 
implications of tMs type of organizational change? Did it lead to more efficient banking and nigher 
profits? Did it have some unwanted side effects? TMs paper tries to answer these questions in the 
next two sections. 
3. Bank Organization and Screening: A Model 
This section develops a model that allows us to discuss the relation between bank 
organization and loan portfolio. The model is a simple version of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) modified 
to fit the bariking issues. 
3.1. Basic Model 
I consider two types of bank organization distinguished by whether credit supervision 
divisions are present or not. In both types of organization, the bank has a branch banking (or 
business promotion) division, wnich identifies good loans and recommends the bank to originate 
the loans. In one type of organization, which is from now on called "double-layered," the bank 
has a credit supervision division, which rechecks the loan opportunities suggested by the branch 
banking division. The bank generates only those loans recommended also by the credit 
supervision division. The other type, wnich is from now on called "single-layered," does not have 
a credit supervision division, and the bank originates all the loans suggested by the branch banking 
division. 
Figure 3 shows the structure of single-layered organization and that of double-layered 
organization grapnically. A reader who is familiar with Sah and Stiglitz (1986) paper will 
immediately recognize that the double-layered structure is the same as what they call "nierarchy": a 
project must be accepted by both divisions. The single-layered structure, however, is slightly 
different from "polyarchy," the other type of organization that Sah and Stiglitz (1986) consider. In 
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the polyarchy, a projected rejected by one division would be reconsidered by the other division, 
and the project would be included in the final portfolio if either one of the two divisions accepts it. 
The single-layered organization screens projects only once. If a project is accepted, it is included 
in the final portfolio. If a project is rejected, it does not have a second chance. The organizational 
change at Sumitomo Bank, which was summarized in the last section, can be considered as a snift 
from a double-layered system to a single-layered system. 
A bank is assumed to face a continuum of loan candidates, each of which requires the same 
amount of lending. An individual loan can be either "good" or "bad." The total size of loan 
candidates for each bank is assumed to be the same and normalized to one. A good loan yields the 
net revenue of X to the bank with probability one, and a bad loan yields the net loss of Z to the 
bank with probability one. Let q be the proportion (and amount, because of our normalization) of 
good loans in the population. Then, the proportion of bad loans is given by 1-q. The bank does 
not know ex ante if a loan is good or bad, but the branch banking division can get a signal for the 
loan quality. The branch banking division recommends the bank to originate the loan when it 
receives a "good" signal. Let p be the probability that the signal is good when the loan is good. 
Let pb be the probability that the signal is good when the loan is bad. Assume the signals are better 
than the totally random signal, i.e., 0 < pb < 1/2 < p < 1. A credit supervision division, if it 
exists, receives a same time of signal that is independent of the signal that branch banking division 
receives. 
The tasks of branch banking division and credit supervision division are essentially the 
same in this simple model. Both evaluate loan candidates using the same type of signal. Branch 
banking and credit supervision divisions represent what Sah and Stiglitz (1986) call screening 
rules. In a single-layered system, the screening happens only once at branch banking. In a 
double-layered system, however, the screening is done twice: once by branch banking and for the 
second time by credit supervision. The difference of single screening and double screening leads 
to a difference in the resulting loan portfolios, as we will see below. 
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In a single-layered bank organization, a good loan is accepted with probability p , and a 
bad loan is accepted with probability pb. Since the proportion of good loans in the initial portfolio 
is q, the amount of loans generated by a single-layered system is given by p q + pb(l-q). In a 
double-layered organization, the loan candidates have to pass two screens. Thus, the probability 
of acceptance for a good loan is given by p 2 and that for a bad project is pb2. Then, the amount of 
loans originated is p 2q + pb2(l-q). It is straight forward to see the followings. 
Proposition 1: 
(1) The amount of loans originated by a bank with single-layered organization is higher than that 
by a bank with double-layered organization, i.e., 
(2) The proportion of bad debt in bank portfolio is lower for a bank with double-layered 
organization, i.e., 
Proof: Straight forward. Omitted. 
Thus, holding p and pb constant (no changes in the screening ability), a shift from a double-
layered system to a single-layered system will increase the amount of loans and the proportion of 
bad debts. 
Next, let us compare the profits under the two alternative organizational structures. letting 
c be the cost of evaluating one unit of loan candidates, the profit of a bank with a single-layered 
organization is given by p„qX - pb(l-q)Z - c, and that of a bank with a double-layered 
organization is pg2qX - pb2(l-q)Z - 2c. The difference of profits can be written as: 
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where a = qX/[Z(l-q)] is a measure of the quality of loans in the population. If there are as many 
good loans as bad loans (i.e., q=l/2), a is greater than one if and only if the revenue from a good 
project, X, exceeds the loss from a bad project, Z. 
Let f(p , pb, a, c) be the expression (1). A single-layered organization brings Mgher 
profits than a double-layered organization if and only if f(p , pb, a, c) > 0. Figure 4 shows loci of 
f(p , pb, a, c) = 0 in the relevant portion of pg-pb space for several values of a and c If a = 1 
and c=0, f(p , pb, a, c) = 0 is given by the straight line with slope - 1 . If c > 0 or a * 1, f(p , pb, 
a, c) = 0 is not a straight line anymore. The curve AC shows an example of f (p , pb, a, c) = 0 
when a is large, i.e., qX is large compared with (l-q)Z, suggesting high profitability of the initial 
portfolio. More specifically, the condition for the curve to look like AC (f(pg, pb, a, c) = 0 hits 
the pb = 1/2 line) is given by (l-a)/4a < c/qX. The curve BC gives another possibility, wnich 
may arise when a is small. The condition for the curve to look like BC is given by (l-a)/4oc > 
c/qX.4 Both AC and BC are drawn for the same value of c, and the point C is given by (p , pb) = 
(1, ( l - V l - 4 c / ( l - q ) Z ) / 2 ) . 
In each case, f(p , pb, a, c) < 0 in the region above the curve, and f(p , pb, a, c) > 0 in 
the region below the curve. Higher a and/or higher c push up the curve, so that the region where 
4 If (l-a)/4oc is exactly equal to c/qX, f(pg, pb, a, c) = 0 goes through (pg, pb) = (1/2, 
1/2), but it is not a straight line and goes through (pg, pb) = (1, (1-^/ a )/2). 
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f(p , pb, a, c) > 0 expands. This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Single-layered organization tends to yield higher profits when: 
(i) p and pb are small, 
(ii) a is large, and 
(iii) c is large. 
Double-layered organization tends to do yield higher profits when: 
(i) pg and pb are large, 
(ii) a is small, and 
(iii) c is small. 
The results can be interpreted intuitively. As Sah and Stiglitz (1986) point out, two systems differ 
in the relative likelihood of Type I error (rejecting a good loan) and Type II error (accepting a bad 
loan). Since a loan has to go through the screening process twice to get approved under a double-
layered system, Type I error increases while Type II error falls. Thus, when Type II error is a 
more serious problem than Type I error, the double-layered organization tends to do better than the 
single-layered organization. Note (1-p J is the probability of Type I error in each screening and p b 
is the probability of Type II error. The proposition shows that when 1-p is small (i.e., low Type 
I error) and pb is large (i.e., high Type II error), the double-layered structure does better. Type II 
error becomes a serious problem when there are many bad loans out there and the cost of making a 
bad loan is large, i.e. when the quality of initial portfolio, a, is low. In such a case, the double-
layered structure does better. Finally, unlike the model of hierarchy and polyarchy by Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986), two alternative organizational structures considered in this paper have different 
costs. The cost is unambiguously higher for the double-layered structure because it screens each 
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loan twice. Thus, when the screening cost, c, is high, the single-layered structure tends to do 
better. 
3.2. Endogenous Monitoring Intensity 
Effectiveness of screening, represented by p and pb, has been assumed constant so far. It 
is probably more reasonable, at least for the long run, to assume that a division in a bank can 
improve its ability to evaluate loans by putting in some efforts. Then, the difference in 
organizational structures may influence the amount of efforts taken by each division and the overall 
screening performance. This subsection considers such an extension of the basic model. 
Assume that p and pb are now functions of the effort level, m (>0), of a division. Let 
p (m) and pb(m) denote those functions, and assume p ' > 0, pb ' < 0, p " < 0, and p b " > 0, 
where f denotes the first derivative of function f(-) and f' denotes its second derivative. Assume 
p (0) = pb(0) = 1/2, limm^TOp (m) = 1, and l in^^^p^m) = 0, so that zero level of efforts implies 
totally random screening and the infinite level of efforts implies the perfect screening. By putting 
more efforts, they can lower both Type I error (1-pJ and Type II error (pb). For simplicity, 
assume that a marginal increase in the effort level reduces both types of errors by the same 
magnitude, i.e., p ' = -pb ' - The marginal reduction of those errors is decreasing in the effort 
level. Efforts are costly, and the cost of efforts is assumed to be C(m) with C > 0 and C" > 0. 
To ensure internal solutions to the maximization problems below, assume p '(1/2) = °°, pb'(l/2) = 
-°°'
 l i m
m_^Pg ' (m) = 0, l im m ^p b ' (m) = 0. 
First, consider the choice of effort level in a single-layered organization. The profit 
maximizing level of effort is the solution to the following maximization problem: 
The first order condition is given by: 
qXpg'(m) - (l-q)Zpb'(m) - C*(m) = 0. 
Noting that p ' = - p b \ one can rewrite this as: 
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(3) ^ l l
 = q x + (l-q)Z, 
Pg ( m ) 
where ms denotes the optimal level of m under the single-layered organization. 
Similarly, the optimal level of effort in the double-layered organization is given by the 
solution to the following maximization problem: 
Note that a loan must go through screening twice and each division must pay for the efforts. The 
first order condition for the maximization is given by: 
2qXpg(m)pg'(m) - 2(l-q)Zpb(m)pb'(m) - 2C'(m) = 0, 
wMch can be rewritten as: 
(5) - £ £ L l
 = qXpg(md) + (l-q)Zpb(md), 
Pg (m ) 
noting that p ' = -p b ' - The optimal level of m under the double-layered organization is denoted by 
md. 




' ( m d ) ^ C'(ms) 
P g ' ( m ) Pg'(mS) 
Because C" > 0 and p " < 0, the function C7p ' is increasing in its argument. This establishes 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 : If the effectiveness of loan screening process is a function of efforts, and an 
increment to an effort level always lowers the two types of errors by the same magnitude (i.e., p ' 
= -pb ' ) , the optimal level of effort for the single-layered organization is strictly higher than that for 
the double-layered organization. 
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Because the single-layered organization screens the loan candidates only once, it invests more in 
screening technology than a double-layered organization would to make the right decision. 
When the banks are allowed to choose the magnitude of screening optimally, the profits 
comparison between alternative organizational structures becomes difficult. The earlier analysis 
does not apply because each organizational structure has different screening technology. The 
following proposition establishes a very limited condition that enables a simple performance 
comparison between two structures. 
Proposition 4: Let ms and md denote the optimal level of screening effort in the single-layered 
organization and that in the double-layered organization respectively. Then, 
(i). If (p (md), pb(md)) lies in the region below the threshold f(p , pb, a, c) = 0 in Figure 4, the 
profits of the single-layered organization are higher than those of the double-layered organization. 
(ii). If (p (ms), pb(ms)) lies in the region above the threshold f(p , pb, a , c) = 0 in Figure 4, the 
profits of the double-layered organization are nigher than those of the single-layered organization. 
Proof: The region below the threshold f(p , pb, a, c) = 0 in Figure 4 is where the single-layered 
organization has higher profits than the double-layered organization when they have the same 
screening technology. If (p (md), pb(md)) lies in the region, it means that the single-layered 
organization has higher profits than the double-layered organization when they are forced to put in 
the level of efforts that is optimal for the double-layered organization, which is suboptimal for the 
single-layered organization. Since the single-layered organization has higher profits than the 
double-layered organization at a suboptimal level of m, it must have higher profits at the optimal 
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level. A similar argument can be made to prove the second part. 
4. Empirical Exploration 
The simple model developed in the last section has several interesting empirical implications 
to organizational changes in Japanese banking. The type of organizational change that many 
Japanese banks went through can be considered as the shift from the double-layered organizational 
structure to the single-layered organizational structure. The analysis in the last section suggests the 
following empirical implications. 
If the magnitude of screening does not change when the organizational structure changes, 
wMch may be a reasonable assumption in the short run, the shift to the single-layered structure 
leads to a larger amount of lending (Proposition 1). In addition, Proposition 1 also implies 
deterioration of bank portfolio. Proposition 2 implies that the organizational change increases the 
profits if the quality of the initial portfolio of loan candidates is nigh, Type I error is more serious 
problem than Type II error (i.e., high 1-p and low pb), and screening cost is high. If the initial 
portfolio has a low quality, Type II error is more serious, and screening cost is low, the 
organizational change should decrease the profits. 
As a bank adapts to its new organizational structure, it may start to change the level of 
screening efforts. Proposition 3 shows that the snift from the double-layered organization to the 
single-layered organization must be accompanied by an increase in the intensity of screening. 
This section tries to check if the data from Japanese banks are consistent with these 
empirical implications. The data on organizational structure and performance for 11 city banks 
were collected, and I made simple calculations to check if the model seems to fit the data.5 
I have collected the organizational charts for 13 city banks as of the end of March, 1985 
5
 Obviously, the number of observation (11) is too small for me to allow any reliable 
statistical tests. I plan to expand the analysis to include the other 140 banks (regional, trust, and 
long-term credit) in Japan in the future version of this paper. 
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and March 1989.6 The two dates roughly correspond to the beginning and the peak of asset 
markets boom in Japan, frequently called "bubble economy." Since many problem loans were 
made at the peak of the bubble economy, we expect the organizational structure in 1989 is more 
closely related to the performance in the 1990s. 
The model in the last section suggests that we can distinguish between organizational 
structures by examining whether the loan decision at branch division or business promotion 
division is rechecked at a credit supervision division. Wakabayasni (1991) suggests that we 
observe three different ways to arrange the credit supervision division and business promotion 
division. Figure 5 shows the three alternative arrangements suggested by Wakabayasni (1991). In 
the arrangement A, the business promotion department handles credit supervision. In the 
arrangement B, the business promotion and credit supervision are two sub-departments in the same 
head department. Finally, in the arrangement C, there is a credit supervision department that is 
independent of a business promotion department. 
From the point of view of our model, the arrangements A and B are not very much 
different, because loan candidates are screened only once. In the arrangement C, a loan accepted 
by a branch and the business department will be rechecked at the credit supervision department. 
Thus, I ignore the difference between the arrangements A and B, and distinguish only two types of 
organizational structures, "single-layered" (A or B) or "double-layered" (C). 
Table 1 shows the organizational structures for all city banks in 1985 and 1989. Because 
the merger between Mitsui and Talyo Kobe that created Sakura had not happened in the 1980s, the 
table shows the organizational structures of both Mitsni and Taiyo Kobe. In 1985, both banks had 
double-layered structure, but by 1989, Talyo Kobe's organizational structure had changed to a 
single-layered one. Similarly, the merger between Kyowa and Saltama that formed Asani had not 
6 There were 13 city banks in the 1980s. The merger between Mitsni Bank and Talyo 
Kobe Bank in 1990 and that between Saltama and Kyowa in 1991 reduced the number of banks to 
11. 
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happened in the 1980s. Accordingly, the table shows the organizational structure for both Kyowa 
and Saitama banks. Fortunately for our analysis, both Kyowa and Saitama had single-layered 
organizational structure in both 1985 and 1989. 
The model in the last section predicts that bank organization influences the portfolio 
selection of the bank. Table 2 shows the result of a preliminary analysis. For each bank, the table 
shows (i) the growth rates of loans, (ii) the proportion of bad loans in total loans, and (iii) the 
proportion of loans to real estate sector in total loans. The averages of these variables for the banks 
with double-layered organization are compared to those for the banks with single-layered 
organization, and we will check the difference is consistent with the implications of the model. 
Given the number of observations, we cannot expect to get a statistically significant result.7 
The model in the last section predicts that a single-layered organization makes more loans 
than a double-layered organization, given the same screening technology at each division. Table 2 
shows the result for city banks is consistent with this implication, as far as the point estimates are 
concerned. If we use the organizational structure in 1985 to distinguish between single-layered 
organization and double-layered organization, the growth rate of loans from 1985 to 1989 was on 
average 53.65% for double-layered organization and 59.83% for single-layered organization. If 
we use the structure in 1989 for distinction, the loan growth was on average 54.43% for double-
layered organization and 58.11% for single-layered organization. Similarly, the loan growth from 
1989 to 1993 was also higher for banks with single-layered organization. 
The simple average may give a too much weight on a single bank. To avoid this problem, 
the table also shows the average growth rate weighted by the amount of loans. Thus, the weighted 
average is eqnivalent with the growth rate of the sum of loans. Using the weighted averages 
instead of simple averages does not change the results. The single-layered organization encourages 
the growth of loans more than the double-layered organization does, which is consistent with the 
7
 In a future version of this paper, I plan to do more formal tests by expanding the sample 
to include regional banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. 
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model's implication. 
The model also implies that the proportion of bad loans will be nigher for the single-layered 
organization. Table 2 reports the proportion of bad loans to total loans for each bank. The bad 
loans here are defined as the loans for failed companies and the loans for which the payments have 
been suspended for more than 6 months. The loans with interest rate concessions are not included 
in the definition of bad loans, because Japanese banks did not have to (and did not) disclose those 
loans until very recently. The numbers for bad loans ratios in the table were taken from the 
financial statements for the period ending on September 30, 1993. Again comparing the average 
for double-layered organization to that for single-layered organization, we can check if the result is 
consistent with the model's implication. The differences in averages are all consistent with the 
model, although the difference is sometimes very small. The difference gets larger when the 
organizational structures in 1989 are used to divide banks into two groups. This is promising 
because it is believed that many bad loans were made at the peak of the bubble economy, which 
was 1989, and the organizational structure at that time must have mattered more than that in 1985. 
The last column of Table 2 shows the proportion of the loans made to the real estate 
industry as of March of 1991 for each bank. The data were taken from Yuka Shoken Hokoku-
sho, which is the Japanese equivalent of 10-K form. Since many bad loans are real estate related 
loans, the proportion of real estate lending is believed to be closely correlated with the quality of 
bank portfolio. The table shows the result depends on whether one looks at the organizational 
structure of 1985 or that of 1989. If we divide the sample banks according to their organizational 
structures in 1985, we find that double-layered organization depended on real estate lending more 
than the single-layered organization did. If we divide the sample according to the structures in 
1989, the result is opposite. Banks with the single-layered organization had higher proportion of 
real estate loans in their portfolio than those with the double-layered organization had. If we 
believe the organizational structure at the peak of the bubble economy (1989) was more relevant, 
the result is consistent with the model. 
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Overall, the preliminary analysis suggests that the model developed in the last section 
shows a promise in explaining what happened in the Japanese banking in the last decade. Because 
of the limited number of observations, the results are not entirely decisive. More formal analysis is 
required before we draw a conclusion. 
The model also suggests that a profit maximizing bank with the single-layered organization 
should put in more efforts in the screening process, essentially because the loans are screened oniy 
once. The data in Table 2 cannot check if this is really the case. Some case studies may be useful 
in studying whether sMfts to single-layered organizations were accompanied by increased 
screening efforts.8 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented a simple model of bank organization and loan screening, 
motivated by the Japanese experience in the 1980s. Given the technology of loan screening at each 
division, the model predicts that the single-layered organization (i) originates more loans, (ii) has a 
higher proportion of bad loans than the double-layered organization. It also implies that the single-
layered organization has higher profits than the double-layered organization if (a) the quality of 
initial portfolio is Mgh, (b) the problem of Type I error is serious, (c) the problem of Type II error 
is small, and/or (d) the screening cost is high. When the bank optimally chooses the intensity of 
screening, given the organizational structure, the bank with single-layered organization chooses a 
higher level of efforts to improve the screening skill. The preliminary empirical analysis reported 
in the last section suggests that the model shows some promise in explaining the experience in 
Japanese banking. 
It would be impossible to explain the Japanese experience oniy from the organizational 
changes. Many other factors, including unexpected fall of land prices, deep recessions, and 
8
 Sumitomo Bank (1985), on which I based the case study in Section 2, does not suggest 
any efforts to strengthen screening at branch level or at the brunch banking division. This may 
suggest that the organizational change at Sumitomo was suboptimal. 
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sometimes pure fraud, influenced the performance of Japanese banks. Even with the right 
organizational form and the right degree of screening, the Japanese banks would not have avoided 
the problem entirely. Thus, the organizational design is only one factor that influences the bank 
loan portfolio. The economic importance of the organizational factor must be determined by more 
systematic empirical studies. 
Loan business is oniy one aspect of banking. With the arrival of new financial 
commodities, the importance of loan business for banks is now declining. Thus, making bad loan 
decision is not the only way for a bank to lose money. The recent scandals at Baring and Daiwa 
suggest factors other than loan business can decide the fate of banks. Many other cases suggest, 
however, that making bad loan decision is still the most popular way for banks to lose money. 
This was the case for jusen (Japanese housing corporations), many agricultural cooperatives that 
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